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Using annual serologic surveillance data from all poultry 
farms in the Netherlands during 2007–2013, we quantified 
the risk for the introduction of low pathogenicity avian influ-
enza virus (LPAIV) in different types of poultry production 
farms and putative spatial-environmental risk factors: dis-
tance from poultry farms to clay soil, waterways, and wild wa-
terfowl areas. Outdoor-layer, turkey (meat and breeder), and 
duck (meat and breeder) farms had a significantly higher risk 
for LPAIV introduction than did indoor-layer farms. Except for 
outdoor-layer, all poultry types (i.e., broilers, chicken breed-
ers, ducks, and turkeys) are kept indoors. For all produc-
tion types, LPAIV risk decreased significantly with increasing 
distance to medium-sized waterways and with increasing 
distance to areas with defined wild waterfowl, but only for 
outdoor-layer and turkey farms. Future research should fo-
cus not only on production types but also on distance to wa-
terways and wild bird areas. In addition, settlement of new 
poultry farms in high-risk areas should be discouraged.
Avian influenza is a disease of birds caused by influen-za A viruses. Wild birds, particularly migratory water 
birds, form a natural reservoir of avian influenza viruses. In-
fluenza viruses carry 2 glycoproteins on their surface, hem-
agglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), and on the basis 
of these glycoproteins are divided into subtypes. Eighteen 
distinct subtypes of HA (H1–H18) and 11 NA subtypes 
(N1–N11) have been described. Influenza A(H17N10) and 
A(H18N11), however, were recently detected in bats but 
not in birds. Virtually all remaining combinations of HA 
1–16 and NA 1–9 subtypes have been isolated from wild 
birds (1). Wild birds pose a special risk for introducing 
avian influenza viruses of all subtypes to poultry kept in 
free-range or outdoor facilities (2).
Avian influenza virus infections in wild birds usual-
ly are asymptomatic. Infection of poultry ranges from no 
disease to severe disease and up to 100% mortality (3). A 
virus that causes no or mild disease in chickens is consid-
ered a low pathogenicity avian influenza virus (LPAIV); 
a virus that causes high rates of death in chickens is con-
sidered a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) 
(4). HPAIV outbreaks in poultry cause huge direct and in-
direct economic losses (5). Furthermore, on several occa-
sions during the last decade, bird-to-human transmissions 
of H5, H6, H7, H9, and H10 virus subtypes have occurred, 
emphasizing the threat to public health worldwide (6). Ev-
ery HPAIV described has belonged to H5 and H7 subtypes 
and, until the spread of the Asian HPAIV subtype H5N1 to 
other parts of the world by wild birds since 2005 (7), main-
ly emerged after LPAIV of these subtypes were introduced 
in poultry, particularly in chickens and turkeys (8). There-
fore, LPAIV of the H5 and H7 subtypes is notifiable to 
the World Organisation for Animal Health; consequently, 
member states of the European Union have implemented 
surveillance programs (9). 
In the Netherlands, passive and active surveillance 
programs are in place. In the active serologic surveillance 
program, all poultry farms are tested 1–4 times a year. Fre-
quency of sampling differs among poultry types (indoor- 
and outdoor-layer chickens, chicken breeders, broilers, 
ducks, and turkeys) and housing systems based on the sup-
posed differences in the risk for LPAIV introduction. Ex-
cept for outdoor-layers, all poultry types are kept indoors.
In a previous study (10), a significantly higher risk for 
LPAIV introduction was observed on poultry farms in Eu-
rope housing Anseriformes (duck, geese, and game birds) 
than on farms housing Galliformes (chicken breeders, broil-
ers, layer chickens, and turkeys), and no significant dif-
ferences were observed among Galliformes. In addition, 
Gonzales et al. (11) reported a significantly higher risk for 
LPAIV introduction on outdoor-layer, turkey, duck-breeder, 
and meat-duck farms than on indoor-layer farms in the Neth-
erlands using surveillance data for 2007–2010. These studies 
(10,11) did not find differences in the risk for introduction 
among farms keeping chickens indoors, particularly between 
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layers and broilers, possibly because of the limited data on 
positive introductions (or zero introductions) into broiler 
farms (11), which compromised the power of the compari-
sons. Our objective was to update the risk analysis of intro-
duction of LPAIV infection using an extended surveillance 
period (2007–2013) and add spatial-environmental factors to 
the analysis that might explain part of the variation in LPAIV 
introductions on poultry farms in the Netherlands.
Materials and Methods
Data
We analyzed all data from the Netherlands’ surveillance 
program collected during January 2007–December 2013. 
In the Netherlands, 3 types of surveillance programs are 
used to detect avian influenza virus infections on commer-
cial poultry farms: passive surveillance, early warning, and 
serologic monitoring.
Passive surveillance for the early detection of notifi-
able avian influenza is based on clinical signs (12), an an-
amnesis of exponentially increasing death in the affected 
flock, or both. This surveillance is effective for acute infec-
tion causing severe disease (mainly HPAIV infection) but 
less so for LPAIV infection, which often causes mild or no 
disease. Samples (blood, tissue, and/or tracheal and cloacal 
swabs) of diseased/dead birds are tested by ELISA, PCR, 
and virus isolation.
Early warning includes signals such as aberrations 
in production parameters (decreased egg production, in-
creased death rates, decreased feed and/or water intake). It 
excludes avian influenza as the cause of clinical problems 
in poultry flocks in situations in which birds show clinical 
signs that can be caused by other avian pathogens. Tracheal 
and cloacal swabs are tested for avian influenza by PCR 
(exclusion diagnostics).
The serologic monitoring program is active surveil-
lance to detect all avian influenza virus incursions, even 
those that remain subclinical. This program is much more 
intense than required by the European Union: all poultry 
farms, except outdoor-layer farms and turkey farms, are test-
ed at least once a year. Thirty samples per farm are screened 
by ELISA, and positive samples are confirmed by hemag-
glutination-inhibition test. Outdoor-layer farms are tested 4 
times per year, and turkey farms are tested each production 
cycle. Meat-turkey farms have an average production cycle 
of ≈4 months; for broilers and meat ducks, this cycle is 5–6 
weeks. All sampling is done just before slaughter, except 
the 3 extra samplings in outdoor-layer farms.
Farms were identified by their unique farm number 
and categorized on the basis of poultry production type 
(PT): duck breeders, meat ducks (meat production), turkey 
breeders, meat turkey, broilers, broiler breeders, indoor-
layers, outdoor-layers, and layer breeders.
We selected putative spatial-environmental risk fac-
tors for LPAIV introduction related to farm location for 
incorporation in the risk model. These risk factors were 
distance to clay soil, distance to waterways, and distance to 
defined wild waterfowl areas. 
We analyzed the farms’ distance to clay soil (Geodesk 
database [GDB3]; Wageningen University, Wageningen, 
the Netherlands). Clay soil is a sediment of large rivers and 
is, in epidemiologic terms, a proxy for the presence of large 
water quantities, which is a proxy for an attractive environ-
ment for wild waterfowl. Wild waterfowl is presumed to be 
the most important reservoir for LPAIV. Presence of clay 
soil close to poultry farms was a risk factor for LPAIV in-
troduction on outdoor-layer farms (13).
We also assessed distance from farms to waterways. 
Three sizes of waterways (width in meters) were included in 
the model: small (0.5–3 m wide), medium (3–6 m wide), and 
large (>6 m wide). Presence of waterways is a proxy for an 
attractive environment for wild waterfowl; spatial data of wa-
terways was available from the Dutch Land Registry (http://
www.kadaster.nl/web/artikel/producten/TOP10NL.htm).
Distance to defined wild waterfowl areas is a direct 
proxy for a possible avian influenza virus reservoir. Wild 
waterfowl areas were defined as follows: areas with on av-
erage >5 wild water birds counted per hectare (based on 
systematic regular bird census schemes by Sovon [Nijme-
gen, the Netherlands], which coordinates the monitoring 
of wild bird populations in the Netherlands). Birds of the 
families Anatidae, Laridae, and Rallidae were included; 
these birds are known avian influenza virus carriers (14,15) 
(online Technical Appendix, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/23/9/17-0276-Techapp1.pdf).
Positive Farms
Positive farms were defined as follows: farms with >1 
seropositive animal to any avian influenza strain in both 
the screening ELISA (IDEXX FLockCheck AI MultiS-
Screen, IDEXX Europe B.V., Hoofddorp, the Netherlands) 
and the confirmatory hemagglutination-inhibition test; or 
farms with >3 positive results (of 30 serum samples) in the 
screening ELISA. Furthermore, we included in the analysis 
only primary cases (excluding secondary spread detected 
by epidemiologic tracing).
Period at Risk
Positive Farms
For every year, we estimated the period at risk (in months) 
as the sum of the period from January 1 and the last nega-
tive sampling plus half of the period between the last nega-
tive sampling and the positive sampling. In case of no nega-
tive sampling in the year the farm became positive, the last 
negative sampling of the year before was included. In that 
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instance, the time at risk was estimated as half of the period 
from the last negative sampling to the first positive sam-
pling. Broilers, meat turkeys, and meat ducks were sampled 
1 week before the end of their production. Therefore, the 
period at risk for these PTs was set at a fixed period.
Negative Farms
For every year, we estimated the period at risk (in 
months) as the period from January 1 through last nega-
tive sampling. This sampling was done for all PTs except 
broiler, meat-turkey, and meat-duck farms. For the latter, 
the period at risk was the same as for the corresponding 
positive farms.
Statistical Analysis
We analyzed data using the statistical software R version 
3.1.3 (https://www.r-project.org/). The relative risk (RR) of 
introduction of LPAIV per type of poultry farm (PT), during 
the study period (2007–2013) was quantified using multi-
variate statistical models (known as generalized linear mod-
els or generalized linear mixed models [GLMMs]) (online 
Technical Appendix). We used indoor-layer chicken farms 
as the reference category. In terms of disease causation, if the 
RR is <1, the factor is considered a sparing factor, whereas if 
the RR is >1, the factor is considered a putative causal factor 
(16). In addition, we studied the effect of the spatial-environ-
mental variables (distance to clay soil, waterways, and wild 
waterfowl areas) on the risk for LPAIV introduction. Statis-
tical investigation started with a univariate analysis; distance 
of clay soil to the location of poultry farms was significantly 
associated with risk for LPAIV introduction only for layer 
(indoor and outdoor) farms. The different categories of wa-
terways were significantly associated with risk for LPAIV 
introduction, but medium-sized waterways showed by far 
the strongest association. Thus, in the multivariate analysis, 
distance to clay soil and small- and large-sized waterways 
fell out of the model in the selection process; distance to me-
dium-sized waterways and distance to wild waterfowl areas 
were strongly associated with risk for LPAIV introduction 
and stayed in the model when tested together in the multi-
variate analysis.
Results
During 2007–2013, we surveyed 19,274 farms and detect-
ed 295 LPAIV introductions (Table 1). The Netherlands 
has a small population of turkey and duck breeder farms, 
and these small populations, in particular turkey breeders 
(only 1 farm in 2013 and a maximum of 5 in 2007), made it 
difficult to evaluate potential interactions (e.g., between PT 
and distance variables) when modeling the risk for intro-
duction. Therefore, we first made an overall quantification 
of the RR for each PT and included the year of surveillance 
as a random effect in a GLMM. Broiler, broiler-breeder, 
and layer-breeder farms were at significantly lower risk for 
LPAIV introduction (p<0.05) than were indoor-layer farms 
(e.g., broiler farms had on average a 5 times [1/0.2] lower 
risk for LPAIV introduction than did indoor-layer farms) 
(Table 2). By contrast, the risk was significantly higher 
for outdoor-layer, duck, duck-breeder, meat-turkey, and 
turkey-breeder farms (p<0.05) (e.g., outdoor-layer farms 
had on average a 6.3 times higher risk for LPAIV intro-
ductions than indoor-layer farms). The effect of distance 
from medium-sized waterways to farm location was com-
parable for the different PTs, and we included this variable 
in the GLMM (Table 2). The risk for LPAIV introduction 
decreased with increasing distance from poultry farms to 
medium-sized waterways; RR was highest within the clos-
est 500 m (Figure 1). To evaluate potential statistical in-
teractions, we combined meat-turkey and turkey-breeder 
farms (which had similar RR estimates in our first analy-
sis [Table 2]), and we evaluated the effect of the location 
variables and potential interactions. A generalized linear 
model fit better than a GLMM. We identified significant 
interactions between 1) year of surveillance and indoor- 
and outdoor-layer farms and 2) distance to wild waterfowl 
areas and outdoor-layer farms or meat turkey farms. The 
analysis showed a yearly decrease in the RR for indoor-
layer farms (Table 3), in contrast to an increased risk for 
 
Table 1. LPAIV surveillance data collated from poultry farms, the Netherlands, 2007–2013* 
Type of farm 
No. farms 
positive 
Total no. 
farms 
Median time 
at risk, mo 
Median distance to wild 
water bird areas, m 
Median distance to medium- 
sized waterway, m† 
Probability of 
introduction‡ RR§ 
Indoor-layer 60 5,600 7.3 4,227 769 0.001 1 
Outdoor-layer 143 2,549 6.3 3,996 670 0.009 6.0 
Layer-breeder 14 2,174 9.5 4,157 738 0.001 0.5 
Broiler 2 5,409 1.2 3,292 576 0.000 0.2 
Broiler-breeder 14 2,718 8.5 4,002 824 0.001 0.4 
Meat-turkey 30 469 3.7 3,208 1,042 0.017 11.7 
Turkey-breeder 2 18 5.7 2,035 659 0.019 13.1 
Meat-duck 16 267 1.2 3,477 1,180 0.050 33.9 
Duck-breeder 14 70 5.8 4,107 767 0.034 23.4 
*LPAIV, low pathogenicity avian influenza virus; RR, relative risk. 
†Distance to clay soil and distance to small- and large-sized waterways also included in the multivariate analysis (data not shown). They did not have a 
significant effect on the risk for LPAIV introduction. Waterway sizes were defined as follows: small, 0.5–3 m wide; medium, 3–6 m wide; large, >6 m wide. 
‡Unadjusted probabilities of LPAIV introduction per farm months at risk. 
§These are the unadjusted RR estimates obtained by dividing the unadjusted probabilities of LPAIV introduction of each type of poultry farm by that of 
indoor-layer farms. 
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outdoor-layer farms for 2012 and 2013 (Figure 2). The risk 
for LPAIV introduction in outdoor-layer and meat turkey 
farms decreased with increasing distance to areas with wild 
waterfowl (Figures 2, 3). No significant risk was found for 
distance to clay soil.
Discussion
Our study shows that outdoor-layer, duck (breeder and 
meat), and turkey (breeder and meat) farms have a signifi-
cantly higher RR for LPAIV introduction than do indoor-
layer farms. The higher risk in outdoor-layer farms probably 
reflects their higher exposure to LPAIV from a contami-
nated environment. The presence of avian influenza in wild 
water birds and the frequency of direct or indirect contact 
between reservoir birds and poultry are risk components 
that enable transmission from wild birds to poultry. How-
ever, in addition to the higher introduction rate on outdoor-
layer farms (this study) and the genetic relationship of wild 
bird strains and avian influenza outbreak viruses (17), no 
scientific data have been available that could support this 
assumption, although physical environmental factors, such 
as surface water availability and proximity to lakes and 
wetlands, have been suggested as drivers of HPAIV H5N1 
outbreaks in poultry and wild birds (18,19).
We described a significant spatial-environmental rela-
tionship: the closer to waterways—a proxy for an attrac-
tive environment for wild waterfowl—and wild waterfowl 
areas a farm is located, in particular outdoor-layer farms, 
the higher the risk for LPAIV introduction. Although wa-
terfowl and shorebirds are known to form the major natu-
ral reservoir and source of all known influenza A viruses 
(14,20,21), there is little direct evidence for transmission 
of avian influenza virus from (wild) birds to poultry. Two 
lines of evidence suggest that wild birds can be the source 
of avian influenza infection in poultry: 1) temporal associa-
tions between avian influenza virus isolated from wild birds 
and from outbreaks in poultry flocks and 2) genetic similar-
ity between avian influenza virus strains isolated from wild 
birds and from poultry. Phylogenetic studies support the 
presumed transmission route from wild birds to poultry. For 
example, an LPAIV H7N7 caused the HPAI H7N7 epidem-
ic in the Netherlands that started at a free-range farm (22). 
This virus is believed to be a reassortant of an H7N3 virus 
and an H10N7 virus isolated from mallards in 2000 during 
survey studies of migratory wild birds in the Netherlands 
(23). Furthermore, recent genetic analyses of HPAIV H5N8 
strains from the Netherlands, and of other strains from 
countries in Europe, South Korea, and Japan, suggested that 
the strains from Europe probably arrived through migratory 
wild birds from Asia, most likely through overlapping fly-
ways and common breeding sites in Siberia (24,25).
In the Netherlands, turkeys are raised indoors, and 
despite the small number of turkey farms, we observed a 
higher RR for introduction of LPAIV infection to breeder 
and meat-turkey farms. This higher risk might be associat-
ed partly with the apparent higher susceptibility of turkeys 
than chickens to LPAIV infection (26).
As reported by Gonzales et al. (10), we found that 
duck-breeder farms have the highest RR for LPAIV in-
troduction. This risk could be related to their higher sus-
ceptibility to infection with LPAIV of wild water bird 
origin (ducks, geese, and swans) than chickens (27) and 
 
Table 2. Relative risks for introduction of low pathogenicity avian 
influenza virus infection in different types of poultry farms, the 
Netherlands, 2007–2013 
Type of poultry farm Relative risk (95% CI) p value 
Indoor-layer 1.0 (reference)  
Outdoor-layer 6.3 (4.7–8.6) <0.00001 
Layer-breeder 0.5 (0.3–0.8) 0.008 
Broiler 0.2 (0.1–0.8) 0.02 
Broiler-breeder 0.4 (0.2–0.8) 0.004 
Meat-turkey 12.0 (7.8–18.8) <0.00001 
Turkey-breeder 11.3 (2.8–46.2) 0.0008 
Meat-duck 39.5 (22.6–69.1) <0.00001 
Duck-breeder 25.5 (14.2–45.9) <0.00001 
Natural logarithm* 0.8 (0.7–0.9) 0.00005 
*Of distance to medium-sized waterways in meters, i.e., 3–6 m wide. 
 
Figure 1. Risk for introduction of low pathogenicity avian influenza 
virus into duck-breeder, meat-duck, meat-turkey, and outdoor-layer 
farms, the Netherlands, 2007–2013. For the estimation of the 
relative risk as a function of distance to medium-sized waterways 
(3–6 m wide), distance to wild waterfowl areas was kept constant.
 
Table 3. Yearly relative risk for introduction of low pathogenicity 
avian influenza virus in indoor-layer farms, the Netherlands 
Year Relative risk (95% CI) 
2007  1 (reference) 
2008 0.65 (0.48–1.04) 
2009 0.63 (0.28–0.84) 
2010 0.41 (0.28–0.68) 
2011 0.56 (0.44–0.70) 
2012 0.5 (0.30–0.83) 
2013 0.15 (0.04–0.27) 
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their long production cycle (time of exposure). We also 
observed a significantly higher risk for LPAIV introduc-
tion into meat-duck farms than into indoor-layer farms. 
This finding is somewhat surprising because meat ducks 
are kept indoors and have a short production cycle (6.5 
weeks), in contrast with broilers, which also are kept in-
doors, have a short production cycle (6 weeks), and had a 
very low risk for LPAIV introduction. The higher suscep-
tibility of ducks than chickens to LPAIV (27) could be a 
reason to explain this contrast. In addition, poor biosecu-
rity compliance might play a role. For instance, floor bed-
ding for ducks is stored outside (often not protected by a 
cover) and transported inside the duck house several times 
during the growing period. Bedding material for broilers 
is mostly stored inside the poultry house and is placed 
only once during the production cycle or not replaced. 
Poor biosecurity compliance has been reported repeatedly 
in poultry production (28–30). Meat ducks and broilers 
are tested before slaughter, and considering that the time 
to build up a serologic prevalence after an LPAIV infec-
tion that can be detected by random sampling could take 
≈2–3 weeks (31), LPAIV introductions that occur shortly 
before slaughter could be missed. Therefore, the RRs 
could be underestimated for both meat ducks and broilers. 
Nevertheless, by looking at the large number of broiler 
flocks tested along these years, the fact that only 2 LPAIV 
introductions were detected, and the fact that surveillance 
was able to detect a relatively high number of LPAIV in-
troductions in meat ducks (also short production cycle), 
we conclude that the risk for LPAIV introduction in broil-
ers is low under housing conditions in the Netherlands.
In addition, the RR for layer-breeder farms was 5 times 
lower for LPAIV introduction than it was for indoor-layer 
farms (2011–2013). These findings might be related to the 
high biosecurity levels on these PTs.
Our finding that the RR for LPAIV introduction on 
outdoor-layer farms increased over time (a significantly 
higher RR in 2013 than in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011) 
can be explained by an increase of the number of introduc-
tions on outdoor-layer farms, especially in 2012 and 2013. 
An increase in the number of outdoor-layer farms and a 
decrease in the number of indoor-layer farms (for which 
RR decreased over time), particularly in 2012 and 2013, 
might partly explain these changes in risk. Further research 
is needed to gain insight into the factors that might affect 
introduction rates and differences over time. A plausible 
explanation might be increased direct or indirect contact 
between outdoor ranging poultry and infectious wild bird 
populations, but this explanation remains speculative be-
cause field data on the type and frequency of contact be-
tween wild birds and poultry in outdoor-layer farms is still 
missing. Climate and land use changes during the past 
decades have affected winter and breeding bird commu-
nity composition (32); effects on herbivorous birds (such 
as many waterfowl species) through phenology-induced 
changes of plant forage quality and availability are most 
pronounced (33,34).
As recent experience shows, wild birds can introduce 
HPAIV directly into poultry (24,25), and HPAIV can 
Figure 2. Risk for introduction of low pathogenicity avian influenza 
virus into outdoor-layer farms, the Netherlands, 2007–2013. 
Relative risk is shown for 2007 (reference for between-year 
comparison), 2012 (p = 0.08), and 2013 (p = 0.005). For the 
estimation of the relative risk as a function of distance to wild 
waterfowl areas, distance to medium-sized waterways (3–6 m 
wide) was kept constant.
Figure 3. Relative risk for introduction of low pathogenicity avian 
influenza virus into meat-turkey farms, the Netherlands, 2007–
2013. No difference in risk was observed between surveillance 
years. For the estimation of the relative risk as a function of 
distance to wild waterfowl areas, distance to medium-sized 
waterways (3–6 m wide) was kept constant.
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emerge after an LPAIV H5/H7 introduction in poultry after 
varying lengths of time (8). If a notifiable LPAIV subtype 
infects a farm and later spreads to other farms before detec-
tion, the risk increases for mutation to HPAIV (35). There-
fore, the sooner an introduction is detected, the sooner re-
strictive measures can be applied to contain the infection, 
ideally even to the index farm. Early detection and removal 
of infected poultry will help lower viral replication rounds.
Surveillance programs are important tools to prevent 
new HPAIV outbreaks. In the Netherlands the avian influen-
za surveillance program is much more intense than required 
by the European Union (9). Frequent sampling of high-risk 
poultry farms may help reduce the risk for transmission 
between farms (31,36). Based on expected risk factors for 
introduction, outdoor-layer farms (more contact with wild 
birds) and meat-turkey farms (higher susceptibility) are test-
ed more frequently than other poultry farms. The results of 
our study indicate that duck farms also should be tested more 
frequently; passive surveillance will not easily detect LPAIV 
introductions in ducks because LPAIV will not cause ob-
servable clinical signs in them. Furthermore, it is clear that 
we should target surveillance not only toward PT, but also on 
location (e.g., within 500 m of waterways, wild bird areas, or 
both). In addition, there could be a discouraging strategy for 
settlement of new poultry farms in high-risk areas.
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Backyard poultry flocks have increased in popularity concurrent with an increase in live poultry–associated 
salmonellosis (LPAS) outbreaks. In the United States, live poultry–associated  
salmonellosis outbreaks have been documented since 1955. Historically, these outbreaks 
involved young children, occurred in the spring months around Easter, and were  
associated with birds obtained as pets. Baby poultry 
were often dyed bright colors, making them more 
attractive to young children. Currently, public health 
officials are identifying LPAS outbreaks linked 
to backyard poultry flocks that are affecting  
adults and children. The first multistate out-
break where the association with backyard 
flocks was recognized occurred in 2007.
